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RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND SCIENTIFIC 
WELTANSCHAUUNGEN 
Robert TRUNDLE, Jr 
RÉSUMÉ. — Cet article veut montrer le lien qui existe entre certaines idéologies 
socio-politiques et des défis récents posés à la foi judéo-chrétienne. On argumente 
inter alia que de tels défis supposent des théories contestables de la vérité et de la 
signification, propres à la science, subrepticement appliquées aux vues religieuses 
de la nature et de la nature humaine. Quand la nature humaine et la nature sont 
évaluées de cette manière par des idéologies, de telles idéologies commandent ou 
deviennent des Weltanschauungen scientifiques. 
S UMMA RY. — The connection between social-political ideologies and recent challenges 
to Hebraic-Christian belief is clarified. It is argued inter alia that such challenges 
suppose controversial theories of truth and meaning, proper to science, which are 
surreptitiously applied to religious views of nature and human nature. When 
human nature and nature are assessed by ideologies in this manner, such 
ideologies appeal to or become scientific Weltanschauungen. 
T HE DOGMA persists that the Hebraic-Christian religion conflicts with science and that science alone comprises a rational basis for understanding reality. What 
is so disarming about recent forms of this dogma, is that a scientific worldview or 
Weltanschauung is concealed with ostensive tolerance for the truth or meaningfulness 
of religious discourse. My goal is to expose and refute such dogma in several ways. 
First, I shall review the empirical and theoretical structure of scientific theory in 
order to show that it is inherently incapable of being dogmatically juxtaposed to the 
Hebraic-Christian religion. Second, I will argue that several representative Weltan-
schauungen, which hold that all experience is understood through the empirical and 
theoretical framework of science, are untenable if not incoherent. Finally, this 
discussion provides a unique background for construing social-political ideologies 
(Marxism and radical feminism) which embrace such Weltanschauungen. Therefore, 
while they cannot be fully assessed in the space provided, their connection to these 
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Weltanschauungen can be briefly but fruitfully acknowledged. My aim is not to 
establish claims of the Hebraic-Christian religion or even to clarify the epistemic 
status of such claims. Rather, I seek to obviate the dogma that science and views based 
upon it render traditional religious belief meaningless. 
Let me discuss scientific theory, specify what is meant by "Weltanschauung", and 
examine scientific Weltanschauungen after commenting on my aims and methodology. 
While neither an explication of epistemic difficulties in science per se nor 
recognition of scientific Weltanschauungen per se might comprise wholly new insights, 
the connection of such difficulties in science to unwarranted rejections of religion is, 
hopefully, quite timely and contributory. If it is not, it is indeed mysterious why 
scholarly institutions so uncritically acknowledge the contributions of such Weltan-
schauungen and their social-political progeny. It is alarming that this point needs to be 
stressed. But given the influence of these Weltanschauungen and ideologies (whose 
self-proclaimed "rationality" and "liberation" are chimera belying zealous intolerance) 
this brief "apologetics" for an apologetics seems appropriate. Its appropriateness will 
be especially apparent in my discussion of ideologies. 
Further, since the proponents of Weltanschauungen are themselves typically 
influenced by the Anglo-Saxon positivist tradition, my rebuttal engages in much of 
their "logicized" methodology. Thus what may appear superfluously symbolic may be 
more effective than less anti-pathetic modes such as phenomenology which, while 
important, are often alien to the very scholars who most need to appreciate their 
insights. 
Moreover, my discussion of positivism, although brief, aims at the heart of 
difficulties endemic to contemporary scientific Weltanschauungen and therefore to 
their social-political descendents as well. It is precisely the obsession with supposed 
"complexities" of positivism, known to the esoteric few, which has both encouraged 
disregard of fundamental problems and invited unwarranted peregrination into 
theology and religious practice. 
Finally, my examination of the empirical and theoretical structure of axiomatizable 
theories, as generally accepted in the positivist tradition, relates basic epistemic 
difficulties to metaphysical problems of scientific Weltanschauungen. It is noteworthy 
that axiomatizable theories of physics have generally comprised epistemic models for 
the possibly axiomatizable social sciences which do not have comparable manipulative 
and predictive success. Hence, while it may be objected that scientific Weltanschauungen 
and their social-political offspring are not even potentially axiomatizable theories, 
this, if anything, only underscores my point : they are not bona fide scientific theories 
or their legitimate "offspring", and incoherently conflate physics with metaphysics. 
I. SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 
My discussion of scientific theories shall initially concentrate on theories of 
physics which have methods of coordinating observation statements with theoretical 
ones, or concepts sufficiently clear for fruitful logical axiomatization. Such theories 
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coordinate observation statements with theoretical ones that describe a logicoma-
thematical system at one time which, when taken with substantive axioms and rules of 
logical deducibility, yield predictions of the system at another time. My reason for 
focusing on such theories is that they are generally conceded to constitute paradigm 
knowledgeyielding devices or explanations by which truths are obtained about 
reality '. Thus my analysis initially neglects many scientific theories that do not permit 
fruitful axiomatization, such as Darwin's Theory of Evolution, Hebb's theory of the 
nervoussystem, or theories about higher processes in psychology. How, in contrast to 
these, are the theories of physics employed ? What are difficulties indigenous to them ? 
Simply stated, the employment of a theory of physics involves an initial observation 
statement, say o\. It is typically comprised of such observation terms as "red" or 
"weight" which have immediate reference to sensory experience, and might be a 
statement of the sort "the pointer is at five", o, is "identified" with or transposed into a 
theoretical statement, say t,, comprised of such theoretical terms as "wave function" 
or "mass", and is typically a statement of the sort "photons have zero rest mass". The 
correlation of o, with t, may be expressed by the symbol ' W to express that the 
relation is not one of strict equivalence of any sort. For the observation terms 
comprising observation statements are not readily admitted into logico-mathematical 
frameworks of theories. Rather, their translation into theoretical statements involves 
reducing inexactness for measuring and applying mathematics as well as disregarding 
observational properties which may be irrelevant to a given theory. Thus the reduction 
of an inexact observation statement, o,, to an exact or more exact theoretical one with 
relevant properties, t,, in terms of coordinating rules and definitions, may be 
expressed "o, « t,". When t, is taken with a theory, say T0, and rules of logical 
deducibility, say |-, a theoretical statement (prediction), say t2, is logically derived. 
That is, 11 A T0 | - t2, where t2 is itself coordinated with and understood in terms of 
an observation statement, t2 « o0, by virtue of which T0 may be observationally 
corroborated2. (For my present purpose I avoid the controversy concerning whether 
the observation-theoretical distinction holds prima facie for many terms, e.g. "electric 
charge", or the degree to which observation terms and statements may be theory-
laden). T0 is comprised of general substantive axioms, such as f = ma, the content or 
application of which may be deduced or symbolically interpreted3 in terms of 
mg = md2/sdt2 for free fall, mgSinO =-md2/sdt2 for the simple pendulum, or 
m,d2s,/dt2 + k,s, = k2 (d + s2 - s,) for the first equation of coupled harmonic 
oscillators. 
There are several points, however, that beg for clarification. First, classical 
mechanics might be used, for example, to calculate the free fall of a human being in 
1. The Structure of Scientific Theories, ed. F. Suppe. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1979, p. 716. 
Scientific truth is sometimes understood as applying ceteris paribus to all human experience. For a 
different assessment of truth, concerning "scientific" construals of history, see my expanded version of 
this discussion in J. Dharma 13, pp. 116-140. 
2. See Stephan KORNER'S Fundamental Questions in Philosophy (Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1969), 
p. 83, and Metaphysics : Its Structure and Function (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
The ideas of this scheme are indebted to Korner. 
3. SUPPE, pp. 465, 504. 
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terms of the symbolic interpretation mg = md2/sdt2. The will of the person to fall or 
not to fall may be appropriately disregarded but not denied by the scientist. In classical 
mechanics the electric charge of a particle as well as the free will of persons are both 
ignored. This reflects the limited ontology of the theory and not what does or does not 
exist in reality. This includes the possible existence of referents of religious ontologies, 
including God, soul, heaven, and hell. The objection that such notions refer to 
nonempirical entities merely begs the question regarding whether only observation 
terms and statements that are incorporative into scientific theories have ontological 
significance. But this can only be argued, as I will show, on pain of paradoxically 
insisting on the truth of a verification principle that itself has no truth-value. 
Second, the observation statement o, involves interpretation in terms of specific 
theories, say T h T2, T3... Tn. Thus while T0 represents a generic theory, different 
theories, say T, and T2, may interpret the same observation statement differently. If, 
for example, "o," describes an illuminated patch in a cathode ray tube, T, may 
interpret "o," in terms of the Bohr theory of electron and T2 in terms of another. T3 
may admit of no interpretation in the sense of permitting the schema "o, « t," to 
occur. Hence theoretical systems not only determine what phenomena are ignored or 
admitted but interpret them as well. Indeed, there are no so-called observational truth-
claims which are independent of theoretical and possibly conflicting theoretical 
interpretation. This has obvious and immediate implications for those who glibly 
speak of brute scientific "facts" in conflict with religious belief. Even if scientists could 
agree on what the facts are, it would be rational to suppose that, given the supersession 
of theories in the history of science, any present theory by virtue of which these facts 
are assessed would be superseded by future theories. 
Third, in tangency to point two, any two theories, say T3 and T4, may be 
contradictory or inconsistent but equally successful in explicating and manipulating 
phenomena. Following John Worrall4, there may be a translation procedure by which 
an account of phenomena in terms of T3 may be turned into an account of that 
phenomena in terms of T4. Such translatability would guarantee empirical equivalence 
of T3 and T4, not just with respect to known results, but with all possible results. 
Whether or not this condition in fact obtains is moot. The point remains that such a 
condition is always logically possible and has been called the "underdetermiration of 
theory by data" thesis. If truth-claims, whether observational or theoretical, are true 
only by virtue of interpreting phenomena in terms of T3 and T4 which are inconsistent, 
then the world as understood through T3 and T4 is not the same world but rather 
different worlds. How are the possibly different and inconsistent worlds understood 
by science to be dogmatically contrasted to the world understood by the Hebraic-
Christian religion? 
Fourth, these criticisms are exacerbated by the fact that no amount of successful 
predictions (in terms of o2) verify the truth of T0. The possibilities of future predictions 
that may not obtain (not-o2) are in principle limitless. This is precisely why philosophers 
4. John WORRALL, "Scientific Realism and Scientific Change", The Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982), 
p. 223. 
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of science do, or should, strictly speak of theories as being relatively corroborated, say 
as T5 tending to have more empirical success and subsequently more truth than T6. 
Whether T5 may even be said to be "more true" than T6 is often disputed. It is often 
disputed, for one reason, because by standard rules of logic, true theoretical and 
observation statements, t2 and o2, may follow from or be implied by false ones, o, and 
t,, when t, is taken with T0. Thus if t, is taken with and understood in terms of T0, then 
the success of T0 in yielding t2 and o2 never logically establishes 
the truth of T0. And hence while a specific theory, T5, may have more "relative 
success" than another, T6, at a given time (ignoring possible future "falsification"), a 
verification notion of evidence "counting for" the truth of T5, even as compared to T6, 
is strictly untenable. 
If nothing counts for the truth of a theory per se9 may evidence count against it ? It 
is to be observed that "counting against" qua "falsification" will neither strengthen the 
concept of corroboration nor necessarily render abandonment of T0 even when not-o2 
obtains. In the face of not-o2, auxiliary hypotheses may in principle be generated to 
either enable T0 to successfully predict o2 or explain why o2 does not obtain. Imre 
Lakatos, for example, takes Newton to have done this when the latter developed 
successive models of the sun's planetary system in the face of observational anomalies, 
rather than falsify his laws of dynamics and universal gravitation5. Whether or not 
this exemplifies avoidance of falsification, which W.H. Newton-Smith challenges, it is 
conceded by he and others6 that theories are not up for the easy falsifications typically 
prescribed, for example, by Karl Popper. 
If, of course, T0 has continued and widespread lack of success and explanatory 
power, then it may simply be partially or wholly abandoned. It is beyond my purpose 
to elaborate upon recent debates concerning whether the history of science is 
characterized by the growth of unabandoned commensurable theories which increasingly 
approximate truth (Karl Popper's "verisimilitude") or rather more by dissimilarities 
and limited abandonments. My discussion is not primarily concerned with specific 
theories but rather with epistemological difficulties that in principle attach to the 
employment of theories and the articulation of their truth-claims. The point I have 
sought to stress is, in part, that scientific verification, as a criterion for viable truth-
claims and meaningfulness, is insufficient for unqualifiedly determining what is or is 
not properly a statement, tenable theory, or rational belief. 
What, in view of the foregoing points, is to render "meaningless" the belief that 
whatever occurs, occurs because God wills or allows it, notwithstanding that empirical 
events willed or permitted by God may be partially explained by scientific theories ? Is 
such belief logically absurd or rendered irrational by exhaustive and established 
ontologies of science ? Consider, for example, the belief that God may will or permit a 
person to flee from a potentially violent situation. The person might be said to be 
conscious of God's will to flee in terms either of scripture or "urge" of the Holy Spirit. 
5. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, ed. J. Worrall and G. Currie. Cambridge 
University Press, 1983, p. 50. 
6. W.H. NEWTON-SMITH, The Rationality of Science. Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, pp. 80, 81. 
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While the person's subsequent running may be viewed as both God's will and the 
person's will to be in accord with God's will, the running person may nonetheless be 
understood kinematically in terms of velocity, distance, and acceleration, say v = 
V v02 + 2as, s = v0t + !/2 at2, and a = v2 - v02/2s in the context of "classical" mechanics. 
Similarly, the social-psychologist's successful use of statistics to predict "x" amount of 
suicides in terms of some economic index is not inconsistent with saying that the 
persons in question chose death rather than life if certain financial conditions obtain. 
(Here, of course, Hebraic-Christian belief would entail that God does not will what 
occurs. But His not willing it is not equivalent to His preventing it.) 
Insistence that Hebraic-Christian belief necessarily conflicts with scientific truth 
is neither conceptually tenable nor reflective of ordinary experience, notwithstanding 
the limitation of scientific ontologies and truth-claims. Surely we would say that the 
scientist is absurdly myopic, if not naive, if he or she viewed the running person or 
suicides as mere collections of particles or objects of genetic/environmental conditioning. 
But myopia is compounded by metaphysical difficulties as well. For one who holds 
that nature and human nature are exhaustively explicated through deterministic 
theories must hold that one's own behavior of affirming this truthclaim is itself 
causally determined. But the same individual must unhappily hold that another's 
assertion that it is false is equally determined. And if asserted truth-claims are merely 
caused phenomena, they collapse prima facie as having any epistemic significance. 
This will be specified later with respect to scientific Weltanschauungen and the social-
political ideologies which embrace them. 
Interestingly, a principle of causal determinism, or alternatively of verification, 
are precisely the metaphysical principles on which scientific Weltanschauungen are 
grounded. I have thus far analyzed the limitations of scientific theories and will now 
turn to their metaphysical bases as putative standpoints for rejecting the Hebraic-
Christian religion. 
II. SCIENTIFIC WELTANSCHAUUNGEN 
A "Weltanschauung", for my purpose, constitutes an entire way of looking at the 
world in terms of one's interests, how phenomena and persons are viewed, and what 
demands are made on religion, literature, music, science, technology, art, and society 
in general. A scientific Weltanschauung is therefore a mode of interpreting these, not 
on the basis of this or that physical theory, but rather on the same or similar 
metaphysical assumptions that underlie them. My discussion shall concentrate on the 
relationship of such Weltanschauungen to the Hebraic-Christian religion. 
The dilemma of those having a scientific Weltanschauung is, in part, that the 
metaphysical principles, which are supposed for the intelligibility of scientific inquiry, 
are themselves neither corroborated by empirical means nor tautologous in the sense 
of being logically true. And while metaphysical principles involving verification and 
determinism are corrigible in terms of making them more precise or adequate, their 
adequacy is proper to scientific endeavors and not ceteris paribus to the broad range of 
human experience. Conflating this distinction is a central error of those who posit 
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scientific Weltanschauungen, despite a host of ontological and epistemological problems 
that attach to the mere articulation of scientific truth-claims. 
Let me now address what I consider to be two scientific Weltanschauungen. The 
first is grounded on a verification principle and the second on a notion of determinism. 
Both admit of the truth and meaningfulness of religious belief, but neither paradoxically 
permits such belief to constitute more than insignificant myth. 
A. Weltanschauungen and Verificationism 
My first analysis addresses E.M. Adams' article, "The Accountability of Religious 
Discourse"7. It contains varied and interesting insights, many of which I ignore for my 
limited aim of using the article as an initial foil. As the title suggests, Adams seeks to 
make religious discourse accountable. But his attempt to make it accountable to 
science via verification reduces all tenable religious talk to that explicable through the 
physical-metaphysical framework of science : 
While the Hebraic and Christian religions, for example, may make adjustments 
to accommodate the empirical concepts and findings of modern science without 
endangering their essential beliefs, they are seriously threatened in their fundamentals 
by the naturalistic metaphysics generated by modern science. The humanistic 
metaphysics of religion is logically incompatible with scientific naturalism. 
Whatever counts for the one counts against the other8. 
On the one hand, Adams argues that the possibility of science counting against 
the Hebraic-Christian religion enables that religion to be meaningful and relevant. 
Hence he says that "a religion that was truly immune to human criticism would be 
irrelevant to human life"9. But his intention to connect "relevant" to a scientific 
verification notion of truth is evident in other assertions. Thus, on the other hand, he 
asserts that "if human beings and the lives they live can be located and rendered 
intelligible in the world defined by the conceptual system of modern science, the 
fundamental affirmations of the Hebraic-Christian religion are false"10. These remarks 
amount to saying, however, that the fundamental affirmations of the Hebraic-
Christian religion are relevant or have truth-value if and only if they are false. 
Moreover, his suggestion l l that this religious discourse be understood metaphor-
ically is vacuous, on his own account, since it renders such discourse empty of any 
verifiable truth-value. This becomes clear when Adams says that metaphorical 
discourse is not accountable to historical or scientific fact12, but that a broad 
verifiability criterion for truth-claims nonetheless demands comprehension of what 
7. E.M. ADAMS, "The Accountability of Religious Discourse", International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 18(1985), pp. 3-17. 
8. Ibid., p. 6. 
9. Ibid., p. 5. 
10. Ibid., p. 8. 
11. Ibid., p. 13. 
12. Ibid., p. 14. 
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would count for or against truth-claims 13. But if no historical or scientific facts count 
for or against metaphorical discourse, one wonders what truth-value, and subsequently 
what meaningfulness, such discourse could have. 
What is the difference between Adams' broad construal of verification and a 
narrow one? Let me briefly answer this question with the hope of clarifying the use 
and misuse of verification. 
The words "counting for or against", as narrowly interpreted by positivists, is 
broadened by Adams to ostensively be sensitive to the possible meaningfulness of 
religious discourse. Thus a positivist criterion for truth-claims, in terms of the so-
called "analytic-synthetic distinction", was used inter alia to dogmatically reject 
religious "pseudo-statements" as well as to construe proper entry-level statements for 
transposition into the theoretical discourse of science. Synthetic statements, in the 
latter context, referred to observation statements where observation terms comprising 
them were defined in terms of theoretical terms. The defining process was accomplished 
through correspondence rules of the form Tx = Ox, where "T" is a theoretical term, 
"O" is an observation term, and observation terms refer to specified phenomena or 
phenomenal properties. Theoretical terms and statements of a given theory were 
therefore understood as elliptical sorts of observation terms and statements by virtue 
of such symbolic coordination. Therefore theoretical statements were meaningful 
because observation statements could be straightforwardly verified by sensory experience. 
Analytic statements derived their meaningfulness from the definitions of their symbols 
or words, and as such were logically true (tautologous) or logically false (self-
contradictory). 
Significantly, the intent of positivists happily converged when correspondence 
rules simultaneously transposed observation language into theoretical language and 
prevented the entry of religious discourse into the language of science. All that 
remained to do was to filter the entire world of discourse through the screen of a 
correspondence rule. This amounted, of course, to viewing the world through the 
exhaustive lenses of science. It comprised, in short, a scientific Weltanschauung. 
Unhappily, the genesis of this worldview in a narrow construal of verification, which 
Adams appropriately calls "puritanical", was found deficient. Among other things, 
observation terms were inexact and their potential ontological significance was 
greater than the exact axiomatic interpretations of theories, as above outlined. 
Therefore, theoretical statements or terms were not strictly identifiable with observation 
statements and terms. And thus theoretical statements were not strictly verifiable 
through observation statements, and theoretical statements were not strictly synthetic. 
Moreover, theories that were "verified" by empirical data could themselves have no 
truth-value by virtue of not being statements. This was a serious defect for proponents 
of positivism, and even for a neo-positivist "Received View" (a name introduced by 
Hilary Putnam in 1962). For the latter posited a strong scientific realism whereby a 
central aim of science was to acquire knowledge of how the world really is 14. Finally, 
13. Ibid., p. 7. 
14. SUPPE, The Structure..., pp. 648, 649. 
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the dogmatic construal of verification was an embarrassment, not only because 
realism involved a metaphysical theory rather than a physical theory, but also because 
the verification principle was itself neither a synthetic nor analytic statement. 
The heart of the difficulty is that positivists did not want a scientific Weltanschauung 
underlying a verification principle, but rather an unquestioned verification principle 
underlying a scientific Weltanschauung. But such a narrow verificationism was bound 
to bring attention to itself. Would a broader, almost harmless, construal of verification 
assuage the difficulty ? Is, for example, Adams' broader interpretation more helpful in 
simultaneously supporting a scientific Weltanschauung and rejecting religion ? Such a 
goal, it is to be noted, must appear tolerant of metaphysics and religion on pain of 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater (verification out with metaphysics and 
religion). But this is exactly what occurs. 
I do not seek to impute motives to anyone or even claim that "resurrection" of the 
old scientific Weltanschauung is an explicit goal. Rather, I think that our age is 
burdened with uncritical bias for scientific interpretations of reality that subtly but 
unwarrantedly reject extra-scientific modes of understanding it. 
In any case, a broad verification principle is subject to the same criticism as its 
puritanical sister. Adams specifies that a putative statement is genuine when one 
comprehends what would count for or against it ; "knows something about how its 
truth bears on one's belief system and thus on the world"15. In view of the difficulties 
of positivism, might the statement "theory T, is more true than theory T2 because Tj 
has better empirical corroboration than T2" now have truth-value ? It might inasmuch 
as T, and T2 are loosely construed as statements describing reality which bear on one's 
belief system and the world, say for example, concerning whether nature is or is not 
Euclidean. (Nature's not being Euclidean might bear on one's belief system in the 
sense of one's rejecting a former unqualified belief that nature is as it ordinarily 
appears.) But this broadened interpretation of verification is tolerant of a broader 
interpretation of scientific and not of religious discourse. Moreover, "truth", whether 
of theories or statements, still supposes a kind of correspondence between language or 
parts of language and so-called "empirical reality". Yet this is the very metaphysical 
"stuff" disputed from Plato's "visible and invisible worlds" and Hume's "sense 
impression" to Kant's "phenomena and noumena". A scientific Weltanschauung, 
under the guise of "scientific realism", will not wash just because science is fervently 
said to yield paradigmatic knowledge. Further, does broad verificationism verify itself 
any more than a narrow one ? Or is one to assume that because it is so broad and 
tolerant, it does not need to be questioned? 
Unfortunately, there are no answers to these questions. The difficulty may be 
stated in the form of a disjunctive dilemma: Either proponents of verificationism 
believe or do not believe that the principle is true. If they do not believe it is true, then 
how can putative "facts" or "truth-claims" of science count against those of religion ? 
If they do believe the principle is true, are they not predicating truth of the very 
15. ADAMS, "The Accountability...", p. 3. 
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unverifiable sort of statement they disparage as having truth-value ? Or do they avoid 
the dilemma by incoherently asserting that the principle is true and not true? 
Proponents of scientific Weltanschauungen tacitly affirm such incoherence when 
they uncritically ignore the ground upon which they stand to exhaustively assess truth-
claims. Truth-claims of science can have prima facie no more metaphysical value in 
describing what reality is really like than the metaphysical principle they presuppose. 
The predictive success of theories may tend to generate belief that those theories are 
true by virtue of describing and explaining what reality is like. But believing them to be 
true is no more viable than belief in the truth of a verification principle that itself has 
no truth-value. I will say more on this later. 
It is noteworthy that a broad construal of verification is reminiscent of the very 
Hebraic-Christian religion it is misused to reject. Thus, Christ admonished the 
Pharisees (Luke 7:33) because nothing would count for or against their disbelief : John 
the Baptist was austere and Jesus was not austere (drinking wine and consorting with 
sinners). This does not show that Christ was in spirit a logical positivist. For unlike 
positivists and their contemporary epigonos, Christ did not hide the need for faith and 
raw belief. Christ's admonition does serve to remind an arrogant and disbelieving age 
that verificationism is a two-edged sword. 
B. Weltanschauungen and Determinism 
A verification principle which stipulates that meaningful truth-claims must have 
empirical means of being verified or corroborated, presupposes causal determinism. 
For how could one rely on empirical experience to corroborate predictive theories 
independently of assuming a regularity of the empirical world in terms of causal 
connections between events? One would expect that scientific Weltanschauungen 
would gravitate to such determinism as a natural basis. 
An example of a scientific Weltanschauung involving this determinism is Kurt 
Hubner's Critique of Scientific Reason 16. Its contextuaiist view of history in general 
and science in particular seems circularly based on the causal determinism it seeks to 
explain. What allays suspicion that a scientific Weltanschauung is operant is Hubner's 
thought-provoking exegesis of scientific theories, his purported allowance for religious 
truth-claims, and his recognition that any causal principle is a priori (neither empirically 
verifiable nor tautologous). When the "epistemic smoke clears", however, his position 
is scarcely distinguishable from the "empiricist-rationalist dogma" he decries. 
I shall focus on his determinism after briefly summarizing his relativistic and 
contextuaiist approaches to history. Importantly, my discussion will succinctly 
connect Hubner's view with those of physicists Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, 
as well as Karl Marx. For they comprise similar but influential paradigmatic 
Weltanschauungen which have pejorative implications for Hebraic-Christian belief. 
16. Kurt HUBNER, Critique of Scientific Reason, tr. P.R. Dixon, Jr. and H.M. Dixon. Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1985. 
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On the one hand, Hubner rejects the notion that scientific statements or laws can 
be accepted as mere "facts" or "valid principles". Hence he openly encourages 
recognition of, among other things, religious truth-claims ,7. On the other hand, the 
"many pathways to truth" of religion and science are understood by "general 
structural laws of history" which regard history as historical processes determined by 
psychological, biological, and physical laws 18. Thus while Hubner contests the belief 
that science alone properly monopolizes pathways to truth and reality, he paradoxically 
argues that, from a scientific standpoint, "the very occurrence and rise of the sciences, 
together with the correlative truths and realities of these sciences, must be considered 
as something determined by a historical situation"19. It is not only the history of 
science that Hubner construes deterministically from a scientific standpoint, but all 
history, including that of the Hebraic-Christian religion. (It is a. foregone conclusion 
that miracles of the Old and New Testaments, much less those reported at Fatima of 
1917 and Medjugorje since 1981, must be "scientifically" explained away.) 
Although he rejects strict determinism in terms of causal or numerical (physical 
or mathematical) sequences, he says that his structural laws are based on a "purely 
logical analysis of science and the manner in which science regards its own history as 
well as any history whatsoever" (his emphasis)20. Hiibner's apparent tolerance for 
religious belief seems intelligible here when he concludes that the empiricist-rationalist 
bias of our scientific age was determined by our age's need to eliminate inconsistencies 
of another age's worldview. "Age" can be understood as "historical situation" or 
"historical context", and hence I partially refer to his position as "contextualism". But 
it is ironic that Hubner seeks the "démystification of science" by assuming the science 
he seeks to demystify. 
Indeed, "démystification" is a much abused word in the post-Nietzschean West, 
and is reminiscent of attempts to denounce everything from a feminine mystique and 
sexual behavior to, most especially, religion. It is not therefore surprising that Hubner 
speaks of spiritual-intellectual upheavals which resulted in the dissolution of the 
"Christian-mythical worldview" ; of historical shifts from simple notions of above 
(heaven) and below (hell) to homogenous or isotropic assumptions of nature underlying 
relativity physics or quantum mechanics21. 
As with the misuse of scientific verification, one again witnesses the reduction of 
all language to language about empirical nature. How could it be otherwise that such 
misuse will occur when one seeks to construe all human experience in terms of how 
"science regards its own history as well as any history whatsoever"22? For, as I will 
17. Ibid., pp. XI, 106. 
18. Ibid, pp. 114, 115. 
19. Ibid, p. 124. 
20. Ibid, pp. 115, 124. 
21. Ibid., p. 151. 
22. Ibid., pp. 115, 124. 
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expand upon shortly, causal determinism is a necessary presupposition23 of science, 
and science via verification is inextricably reductive in grounding all language on 
sensory experience. 
I now note that the notions of "heaven" and "hell" were, of course, never 
understood by the apostles as scientific descriptions the meanings of which were 
relative to varying historical contexts. When the apostles in the New Testament or 
Christians today speak of heaven above, they refer to a spiritual place where God 
resides and not to another empirical world. There are everyday assertions, say "the sun 
is rising", as well as religious ones, which perdure independently of shifting scientific 
contexts. But this seems entirely ignored in Hubner's deterministic contextualism. 
When common persons asserted in pre-relativistic physics that the sun rises, can they 
not simply have meant that it is time to get up? Were they necessarily postulating 
scientific descriptions of the relative motions of heavenly bodies? Everyday language 
as well as religious discourse are not merely pre-scientific in the sense of being 
primitive empirical state descriptions which attach to some unfruitful pre-axiomatized 
theories of nature. Therefore such discourse is not subject to verification or causal 
principles that are formulated in the first place to clarify the intelligibility of scientific 
discourse. Is metaphysical discourse presupposed by science, for that matter, the same 
as scientific discourse ? Does the former discourse also change with historical periods ? 
If so, one wonders how Hiibner could construe history deterministically from a 
scientific perspective. 
My criticism of Hiibner is timely in view of the actual or possible impact of similar 
positions, including Kuhn's and Feyerabend's, on a so-called "liberated theology". I 
will briefly consider this connection after examining how Hubner's contextualism is 
related to an epistemic relativism. 
His contextualism understands "good", "bad", "true", and "false" as notions 
wholly relative to changing historical rules. The latter are themselves determined or 
caused by anomalies which are compared to the "historical evolution" of a card game : 
Let us assume that some people are playing cards. The rules of the game will then 
determine what is true, good or bad... Now assume further that there are certain 
inconsistencies in the rules. They will change the rules; along with this what is 
true and false, good and bad, in the game will also change24. 
23. One might object to the notion that causal determinism is a necessary (a priori) presupposition of 
science on the ground, for example, that various theories including quantum mechanics contain 
equations of probability. Moreover, it might be objected that various laws, e.g. Newton's inverse 
square as a classic case, make no reference to causality, e.g. to the cause of gravity. In response, one may 
observe that the equations of quantum mechanics are deterministic of probabilities and ihat this no 
more admits of "indeterminism" or "free will" than the determinism of precise measurement. And laws 
such as Newton's inverse square, while not explanations or descriptions in terms of causes, presuppose 
causal determinism in terms of causal regularities, e.g. with respect to the behavior of bodies qua point 
sources in the case of Newton. It is difficult to see how laws or theories could be used to explicate or 
manipulate phenomena independently of the corrigible supposition or presupposition that events have 
causes. (With regard to "manipulation", for example, Ian Hacking and Nancy Cartwright base our 
belief in electrons qua really existing causes of observational phenomena, not on "saving the 
phenomena", but on our ability to create new phenomena. See their "experimentation and Scientific 
Realism" and "When Explanation Leads to Inference", Philosophical Topics, 13 (1982). 
24. Ibid., p. 210. 
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Thus Hiibner says, for example, that it is senseless today to assert that space is or 
is not Euclidean, but meaningful to say Euclidean nature was well-grounded in the 
Renaissance. (In the same way, it would be presumably senseless to assert in one 
version of cards that a certain suit is or is not trump, but meaningful to say it was 
trump in an earlier version.) Similarly, one might suppose by Hubner's analysis, that it 
is senseless for Christians to assert today that homosexuality is or is not immoral. But 
it would be presumably meaningful to say the immorality of homosexuality was well-
grounded in St. Paul's Rome of 56 A.D. This assumes, of course, that the Hebraic-
Christian religion has not been exhaustively demystified by a science which is itself 
being demystified. 
It should be observed that Hiibner is not speaking of a positivist notion of 
"senseless" in terms of a pseudo-statement lacking possible verification. Rather, by his 
own analogy, "senseless" is viewed in light of varying rules which determine truth, and 
rules which are themselves determined by inconsistencies similar to those generated in 
a game. But if it is true in one version of a game to assert that a suit is trump, would it 
not be simply false in another version to state this? Would we ordinarily say o/one's 
question in one version, "Is or is not this suit trump ?", that it is senseless ? I suggest 
that we would in fact assert that it is not the case that it is trump. That is, it is false to 
say it is trump. 
It is not surprising that Hiibner, following the troubled heels of Kuhn and 
Feyerabend, replaces "false" with "senseless" when so doing is nevertheless inappropriate. 
Kuhn and Feyerabend held that truth is relative to incommensurable scientific 
revolutions and theories respectively. Thus Einstein would be unable to agree with 
Newton about the meaning of the observation term "red", much less the theoretical 
term "mass", by virtue of viewing the world through incomparable paradigms or 
theories in history. Moreover, both the positions of Kuhn and Feyerabend entail that 
persons are caused to interpret phenomena in terms of changing paradigms (disciplinary 
matrixes) and theories respectively25. Therefore both view human nature as well as 
nature deterministically (scientifically). In short, they share similar scientific Weltan-
schauungen by which paradigms or theories determine incommensurable notions of 
truth. But a particularly knotty problem ensues which renders such contextualistic 
and relativistic theses trivial unless incoherent. 
The difficulty of the thesis that truth changes from age to age, period to period, 
theory to theory, or epoch to epoch, may be formulated in terms of the sentence, "It is 
possible that statement'S' is true in © and false in ^ " , where " 0 " and " ¥ " refer to 
25. The "later Kuhn" speaks of disciplinary matrixes, e.g. models, exemplars, and symbolic generalizations, 
as conditioning scientists to view phenomena certain ways and of scientists or students as being 
"programmed". See his "Second Thoughts on Paradigms", Suppe, pp. 474-475. Feyerabend speaks of 
observers being "caused to accept or reject" uninterpreted (observation) sentences in response to 
sensory phenomena, where such sentences are interpreted as observation statements in the context of a 
theory. See Suppe, p. 637. My criticism is that if conceptual activity and language are theory-
dependent, as Feyerabend argues, then uninterpreted sentences that persons are caused to accept 
(reject) are themselves already theory dependent. This entails that persons are caused to accept (reject) 
and interpret phenomena in terms of theories. The Structure of Scientific Theories nowhere seems to 
criticize such scientific (deterministic) construals of human beings. 
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whatever it is to which truth is relative26. The sentence may mean that the same 
statement "S" has different meanings in different historical contexts. But if all the 
sentence asserts is that "S" with different meanings has different truth values, and if 
this is necessarily the case, then the sentence is trivially true. But if "S" in © and ty 
expresses the same statement, say p, then the sentence is incoherent. For if "S" in © 
and "^  expresses p, then "S" in © and ^ has the same truth conditions. And if the 
conditions for what make "S" true or false are identical for "S" in © and W, then it is 
incoherent for "S" to be true in © but false in W. Hence the sentence is trivial unless 
incoherent, and Hubner's thesis, as well as those of Kuhn and Feyerabend, are thus 
incoherent if not trivial. 
It is beyond my scope to elaborate upon similarities between Hubner's relativism 
and those of Kuhn and Feyerabend. But given their real or potential impact on the 
Hebraic-Christian religion, it seems appropriate to mention some connection. 
Despite Hubner's self-proclaimed disassociation from Kuhn, one suspects that 
such positions challenge the Hebraic-Christian religion, in a unique way, on everything 
from "gay rights" and militant political activism to the ordination of women and the 
very divinity of Christ27. The thesis of relativism, whether of Hubner's varying 
historical rules, Kuhn's revolutionary paradigms, or Feyerabend's incommensurable 
theories, lend themselves to a "liberation theology" in which all scriptural discourse is 
relative to incomparable cultural revolutions. For it is such radically incomparable 
contexts that comprise kinds of worldviews through which all experience is filtered 
(interpreted). Just as incommensurable theories or scientific revolutions putatively 
determine incomparable meanings of scientific language, so they radically alter the 
meanings of the words of the prophets, apostles, and God Himself (or Herself, 
depending on one's historical context). That is, Hebraic-Christian belief may be 
"liberated" from outmoded historical interpretations. In this manner of liberated 
interpretation, the very words of Revelation (22:18, 19) become vacuous : 
I myself give witness to all who hear the prophetic words of this book. If anyone 
adds to these words, God will visit him with all the plagues described herein ! If 
anyone takes away from the words of this prophetic book, God will take away his 
share in the tree of life and the holy city described here ! 
The relativistic thesis would add to and take away from such words or similar 
ones, not literally, but under the guise of a radical scientific hermeneutics which 
renders the author's intention and meaning meaningless. Moreover, God's eternal 
unchanging word or the "word becoming flesh" now paradoxically become the same 
yet incomparable words of incommensurable cultures. But this means that the 
changing meanings of the words of God, the prophets, and apostles are paradoxically 
supplanted by the unchanging meanings of the words which comprise radical theories 
26. See NEWTON-SMITH, The Rationality..., pp. 35, 36, on which this is based. 
27. This is not to deny that some scriptural exegesis or hermeneutics may intelligibly challenge some areas 
of traditional Hebraic-Christian belief. My point is that any analysis becomes relative to and 
determined by a given cultural praxis in this context. 
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of meaning for science. When, for example, Professor Kathryn Parsons asserts that 
Kuhnian paradigms provide the "epistemic rationale" for continual revolutions in 
science and morality28, does she not wonder whether Kuhn's own words are merely 
relative to his historical paradigm ? 
III. WELTANSCHAUUNGEN AND SOCIAL-POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 
There seem to be inescapable similarities to Karl Marx. Indeed, Marx's thought 
may constitute the paradigmatic scientific Weltanschauung which influenced subsequent 
ones. Marx thought that all thought is relative to and determined by historical 
epochs29. Further, he construed his dialectical materialism and history as comprising 
scientific rather than metaphysical (philosophical) analysis. Hence, for example, the 
philosophical thought of Marx was understood by Marx to be scientific when he 
asserted a priori that all history is the history of class struggle. Is there any doubt that 
Marx provided an epistemic rationale, not only for straightforward scientific Weltan-
schauungen, but for contemporary social-political attacks on Hebraic-Christian belief 
as well ? 
Class struggle might today be politically interpreted by some radical feminists, 
following Marx, as gender struggle between males and females. This struggle may 
have the goal either of liberating (eliminating) gender distinction in the context of a 
bourgeois religion wedded to capitalism, or retaining religion but reconstruing it in 
"nonsexist" language. The first alternative would simply view the Hebraic-Christian 
religion as a passing phenomenon in dialectical history. The second might reinterpret, 
among other things, God as Mother or Person, and God the Son as the Human One30. 
The effects of the second alternative on scripture, where both Yahweh relates to Israel 
(e.g., Hosea, Jeremiah) and Christ relates to church (Ephesians) as husbands to wives, 
are virtually to undermine the meaningfulness of the Old and New Testaments. It has 
in fact resulted in defending Jesus and St. Paul, as well as others, from charges of being 
chauvinists31. It amounts, moreover, to the reduction of Hebraic-Christian expatiation 
from inspired to human (male-dominated) truth, thought, and language. 
28. Kathryn Pyne PARSONS, "Nietzsche and Moral Change", from Nietzsche, ed. R.C. Solomon. New 
York, Anchor Press, 1980, p. 192. 
29. See Karl MARX and Frederick ENGELS, Manifesto of the Communist Party, authorized English 
translation (New York, International Publishers, 1968), pp. 6, 26-28. See also Marx's comparison of 
himself to the physicist in Capital: "The physicist either observes natural processes... or, wherever 
possible, he makes experiments under conditions which ensure that the process will occur in its pure 
state. What I have to examine in this work is the capitalist mode of production". 
30. Michael LEVIN, Feminism and Freedom. New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Books, Rutgers 
— The State University, 1987, pp. 251,252.1 recall in church several years ago, on Mother's Day, that a 
minister said unqualifiedly that it made no difference whether we understand God as Father or Mother. 
In some ultimate theological sense this may be so. In an ordinary scriptural sense it is not so inasmuch as 
Christ Himself spoke of God the Father. If we accept "Mother" we may as well accept Christ as 
Daughter and man as woman throughout scripture with no "Slippery Slope" fallacy involved. 
Notwithstanding that we are all "one in Christ" spiritually, one wonders why Genesis distinguished 
between Adam and Eve, Yahweh is the "husband" of Israel, and Christ has the church as His "bride", 
where such distinctions are accompanied by distinctive behaviors in terms of gender. 
31. See "Was Jesus a Chauvinist ?" and " 'I Commend Unto You Phoebe' — Paul", from What You Should 
Know About Women's Lib, ed. Miriam G. Moran (New Canaan, Connecticut, Pivot Books, 1974), 
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But the second alternative is scarcely preferable to the first alternative in which 
religion is a passing phenomenon. For on the second alternative the relativity of truth 
inherent in Marx's dialectical history qua "political science" is "scientifically reinforced" 
by new radical theories of meaning in physics (e.g. Kuhn) and scientific Weltan-
schauungen (e.g. Hiibner). In this sense its ideological twin sister is liberation 
theology: what was true and meaningful for the prophets, apostles, and Christ is 
relative to their incommensurable "chauvinistic" epochs. The social-political revolution 
will yield a liberated non-sexist Kingdom (utopia) on earth. But this could not be 
modeled on a Kingdom of heaven since, following the reductivist positions of Marx, 
Kuhn, or Hiibner, a spiritual realm would be mythological if not meaningless. (While 
it may be objected that this is a "strawman" since radical feminists concede the 
existence of a spiritual realm, the issue is whether this concession is consistent with the 
ontology of Marxist ideology and scientific Weltanschauungen.) 
It is disquieting how much tacit support for both the first and second alternatives 
finds expression in other distinguished philosophers including, for example,, Thomas 
O'Dea and Abraham Edel32. O'Dea commends the seventeenth century scientific 
revolution (which inspired Marx) for wholly "demythologizing" traditional religion. 
Edel, in his Romanell Lecture to the Eastern Division Meeting of the American 
Philosophical Association, December 28, 1986, refers to our "post-Kuhnian era" and 
changing scientific conceptions that properly provide the basis for, among other 
things, the feminist revolt. Can one help wonder about the degree to which many 
contemporary views are influenced by social-political "sticks and carrots" or need to 
appear "progressive"? This is not an ad hominem attack, given the gamut of 
epistemological problems mentioned. It is a question that naturally ensues in view of 
many seasoned philosophers disregarding such obvious difficulties. 
I note that insofar as truth is viewed as a mere political instrument of class 
struggle, any rational assessment of such a feminism would be subject out of hand to 
the criticism that it is merely part of the political struggle. This precludes a priori any 
critical evaluation as sexist, chauvinistic, or reactionary33. Inasmuch as truth., thought, 
pp. 18-24 and 89-96 respectively. LEVIN'S Feminism and Freedom (p. 26) correlates a radical feminism 
to nineteen leading feminists who identify themselves as socialists or Marxists. He notes that 
"According to Germaine Greer, 'The forging-house of most of the younger women's liberation groups 
was the university left wing.'"This is supported by l.T. Sargent who identifies their ideological roots in 
the New Left, a name coined by liberal Marxists centered around the New Left Review in 1959. The 
name "New Left" was then, says Sargent, "appropriated by the growing world student movement and 
mass-media in the mid-1960s". See Sargent's Contemporary Political Ideologies, 7th Ed. (Illinois, 
Dorsey Press, 1987), p. 149. 
32. This refers to EDEL'S Romanell Lecture, "Naturalism and the Concept of Moral Change", published in 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 60, #5 (1987), pp. 823-840. See also Professor 
Thomas O 'DEA'S assertion that "The scientific revolution is instructive for us today... because the 
approach which it fostered has acted as a kind of acid solvent for traditional beliefs... the scientific 
mode of thinking has acted as a kind of demythologizing solvent". ("Religion in the Year 2000", from 
Philosophy Looks to the Future, 2nd Ed., Ed. by Richter and Fogg, Waveland Press, 1985, p. 545). 
33. See LEVIN, Feminism..., pp. 205, 206. He notes that : "Many campuses permit the use of facilities by-
feminist organizations that keep confidential files on 'sexist' professors. Male academics above all seem 
disposed to interpret the initiatives of their feminist colleagues as temporary distortions of a fundamentally 
sound idea. These male academics assume that their feminist colleagues share an allegiance to the 
values of free inquiry that would, in a showdown, lead them to subordinate their ideological agenda to 
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and language are perceived as only modes of political behavior determined by 
historical praxes, such a view is a scientific Weltanschauung. This criticism is not 
"anti-science" or "anti-feminist". What genuinely reflects "anti-science" are views by 
scientists and philosophers of themselves as mere parts of a causally determined 
nature. It is not only degrading but logically incoherent. What reflects "anti-feminism" 
are attempts to ground humane concerns of women on a pseudo-scientific ideology34 
which views women, not as rational decision-making persons, but as determined 
phenomena of historical epochs. 
The fundamental question for scientific Weltanschauungen and their political 
offspring concerns whether Marx's, Kuhn's, or Hubner's assertions about history are 
themselves determined by historical epochs, paradigms, or rules. The paradoxical 
thesis of epistemic relativism is inextricably linked to a causal determinism in these 
cases. If there was no sort of causal connection between and within different historical 
periods, then "revolutions", "inconsistencies", or "paradigms" would be insignificant 
as connectives between such periods and determinants of subsequent conditions for 
truth-claims within them, ascertainable through scientific analysis. The frequent 
denial that Marx posits a "mechanistic determinism"35 does not obviate the fact that, 
insofar as he construes history scientifically, he supposes a causal determinism 
whether of potentially exact or inexact measurement. The notion of inexact measurement 
does not suppose quasi-science anymore than inexact measurements of quantum 
mechanics suppose that it is not science. Either Marx and proponents of scientific 
Weltanschauungen are doing science or not. If they are not, then this should be clearly 
stated. They should openly affirm the bourgeois or dogmatic philosophizing they 
pretend to spurn. The latter is preferable to their present difficulties. 
The paramount difficulty is that if history is scientifically construed in terms of 
the claim that historical periods determine human behavior including truth-claims, 
then truth-claims and the claim at issue are caused phenomena. Notwithstanding an 
apparent epistemic relativism in which the denial of that claim in another historical 
period renders the claim incoherent if not trivial, the underlying incoherency involves 
the notion that truth-claims are caused phenomena. 
For phenomena are precisely what are described by scientific claims or statements 
which may be true or false. But if true or false statements about phenomena are 
reduced to phenomena, then no phenomena are described by statements. Rather 
statements are phenomena and would themselves beg for descriptions by statements. 
Since, however, there are no statements that are not phenomena, there are no 
the preservation of institutional autonomy. This is a mistake. Adherents of an ideology which 
repudiates objective truth can be expected to shape their research for political ends, and academic 
feminists have not hesitated to advocate just this course... A number of feminist historians have urged 
that it should not be said publicly that women tend to make different life choices than men, even if this is 
true, lest the 'political consequences' of such candor be adverse to their goals." 
34. See Ibid., pp. 22, 23. Levin refers to Claire Fulenwider's Feminism in American Politics (New York, 
Praeger, 1980) which empirically tested the claim, with positive results, concerning whether radical, 
socialist, and reform feminism alike function as a political ideology. 
35. See, for example, Martin HOLLIS' Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts On Social Action (New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 17, 18, or Thomas FLYNN'S Sartre and Marxist 
Existentialism (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 73, 200. 
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statements about phenomena which may be true or false. Thus "true" or "false" 
become vacuous concepts. And hence "truth-value" and deterministic historical 
periods as "truth-conditions" for truth-values collapse as intelligible epistemic concepts. 
The difficulty of construing history deterministically is clearly exacerbated by the 
fact that, following Kant's formulation, the notion of determinism is generally 
conceded to comprise a synthetic a priori judgement. It is a priori in the sense that the 
judgement, understood as a causal principle, "every event has a cause", is necessarily 
presupposed for the intelligibility of scientific inquiry independently of experience. 
Thus it is not derived from experience (aposteriori), but is the very precondition for 
scientifically experienced phenomena. The principle is synthetic in the sense that the 
idea of "cause" is not contained in that of "event". Therefore its necessity is not of an 
analytic (logically necessary) sort. (Following Hume, there is no "necessary connexion" 
between events.) Hence the principle, formulated and understood conventionally, "for 
all exactly or inexactly measurable events, there are other events, simultaneous, past, 
and future, to which it is connected by means of causal laws", is neither tautologous 
nor empirically verifiable36. 
And thus the principle which itself has no logically necessary or contingent truth-
value, is the necessary but metaphysical (philosophical) basis of truth-value in the 
employment and articulation of scientific theories. This holds prima facie for quantum 
mechanics as well whose equations may be deterministic of probabilities. But the 
principle is not the necessary basis for truth-value in the employment of theories to 
explicate history or even the history qf science. The contumacious attempts to so 
construe it result in incoherent scientific Weltanschauungen. 
In conclusion, there are inherent epistemic difficulties attaching to truth-claims 
indigenous to the empirical and theoretical employment of scientific theories. This 
alone precludes dogmatic juxtaposition of such claims to religious ones. Moreover, 
such claims can have, on the face of it, no more metaphysical significance concerning 
what reality is like than the metaphysical principles such truth-claims presuppose. 
This means that while the successful employment of theories tends to invoke belief in 
the truth of such metaphysical principles, "belief" is not to be conflated with some sort 
of weak knowledge having truth-value. Such "belief is not epistemologically significant 
in the sense, say, that S rationally believes P if and only if "P" is true and S has 
adequate evidence that P37. For this already presupposes a metaphysical belief for 
which there is no evidence. 
It is this nonepistemic (nonrational) belief I address and which I compare to faith, 
or if that is uncomfortably close to religion, to expectation. Perhaps, one might say, 
some scientists and philosophers believe that metaphysical principles are true in the 
sense that they simply expect nature to behave deterministically. I have no quarrel 
with expectation, if it is simply admitted to be that. My quarrel is with those who 
conflate physics with metaphysics and who disparage a religious tradition that is as 
viable as the scientific tradition they render incoherent. 
36. Cf. HUBNER, Antique..., p. 14. My definition alters his by including inexact measurement. Hiibner 
nevertheless agrees in principle that such measurement may be included. 
37. Cf. Belief and Knowledge in terms of the "K — K Thesis", SUPPE, p. 717. 
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